It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Sign In or Create an Account. Sign In. Advanced Search. Search Menu. Article Navigation. Close mobile search navigation Article Navigation. Volume Article Contents. E rvand A brahamian. Painter David S. Oxford Academic. Google Scholar. Cite Cite David S. Select Format Select format. Permissions Icon Permissions. All rights reserved. Issue Section:. Download all slides.
View Metrics. Still, the steady progression of his views raises the interesting hypothetical question of whether, had he remained in office for another term, Truman might have eventually followed the same path. One of the points of interest about this memo is that it is a progress report from the Eisenhower period on a policy adopted by President Truman.
It is of particular importance because it focuses on a series of specific covert measures the U. This fascinating memo lists several proposed steps to take in the event - apparently still hypothetical at this stage - of a coup against Mosaddeq by "a successor government we wish to support.
The gist of the memo's recommendations is to make sure the new government and the Shah were aware that the United States was ready to offer support. But the authors make clear that any substantive measures would have to be taken outside of the public eye since it "would be literally fatal to any non-communist successor to Mosaddeq if the Iranian public gained an impression that the new premier was a 'foreign tool'.
Written just five days before the initial launching of the coup, this memo reflects several interesting points. For one, it shows how completely out of the picture some parts of the U. Months after Eisenhower's top advisers had given up on winning an oil settlement with Mosaddeq, this paper continues to recommend steps in that direction.
Equally interesting are the author's assessments of Iran's political and economic situation, which are at odds with the views of top policy-makers that led them to approve the coup. Specifically, the author downplays the likelihood of a Tudeh overthrow attempt, saying the party is not "sufficiently strong or well-organized to attempt a coup. The author of this memo also indicates that Iran's economy, while deteriorating, is "in balance" in several areas and continues to allow the government to "meet its fiscal needs.
Source: Freedom of Information Act lawsuit. This page internal history prepared by the CIA's History Staff became available in highly redacted form after the National Security Archive filed a lawsuit with the CIA in for materials relating to Iran in At first it was denied in its entirety, then upon review sections already marked Unclassified were released for the most part , along with a single section previously marked Secret but apparently based primarily on a published account.
The document is potentially of great historical value because it was prepared by a trained historian with the benefit of a variety of still-classified supporting documentation and many years of historical perspective. As such, it would be extremely useful to compare it with the only other extant internal history, which by contrast was written by one of the coup's main architects, Donald Wilber, just a few months after the operation.
In its current largely inaccessible state, however, the document is mostly a testament to the continuing obstacles faced by researchers to a more complete understanding of the coup. Buy this book at Amazon. Contents of this website Copyright National Security Archive. All rights reserved. Department of State, especially the flawed and incomplete volume Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide.
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